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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Using social tables, we make an estimate of global 
inequality (inequality among world citizens) in early 19
th
 
century. We then show that the level and composition of 
global inequality have changed over the last two centuries. 
The level has increased reaching a high plateau around 
1950s, and the main determinants of global inequality have 
become differences in mean country incomes rather than 
inequalities within nations. The inequality extraction ratio 
(the percentage of total inequality that was extracted by 
global elites) has remained surprisingly stable, at around 70 
percent of the maximum global Gini, during the last 100 
years. 
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 Paper to be presented at the XV World Economic History Congress, Utrecht, May 3-8, 2009. I am 
grateful to Alberto Chilosi for the discussion of some of the issues raised in the paper.  
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Introduction: Pre-industrial global inequality 
 
The studies of global, and a fortiori, global pre-industrial inequality are a relatively recent 
phenomenon and they are few in numbers. Obviously, the reason for that is the lack of 
household survey data that are needed for an estimate of global inequality, that is of 
income distribution across all individuals in the world. The lack of household surveys and 
their variable quality is a problem that plagues even contemporary studies of global 
inequality. It is much more severe for the studies of past inequality. But even the very 
concept of global inequality—that is, of measuring and comparing incomes of 
(theoretically) all individuals in the world, is a new one, both because the idea of such a 
study had to wait for a more advanced process of globalization to take hold, and because 
it crucially depends on the availability of purchasing power parity estimates that are 
needed to convert national currency incomes into a single global numeraire. 
 
There are only two long-run empirical historical studies that exist up to now (to the best 
of my knowledge). The first and seminal work was done by François Bourguignon and 
Christian Morrisson in their 2002 American Economic Review paper which estimated 
global inequality from 1820 to 1992. The estimates were  made at more or less regular 
twenty year intervals.  The Bourguignon-Morrisson approach relied on two building 
blocks. The mean incomes of countries were taken from Maddison (2004 or earlier) while 
33 income distributions of uneven qualities and coverage were put together by Christian 
Morrisson to represent various parts of the globe. ―Similar‖ countries were allocated the 
same income distributions, coming from a country where such data were available. This 
has, for obvious reasons, led to many simplifications. In addition, Bourguignon and 
Morrisson used in many cases the 20
th
 century distributions to ―interpolate‖ (backward 
predict) the 19
th
 century distributions for the countries for which 19
th
 century data were 
unavailable. Thus, the number of data points (fractiles of the distributions) which they 
show for each benchmark year, say, 1820, 1850 etc.  (33 ―countries‖ times 11 fractiles) 
are not all really independent data points but estimates based on posterior data.
2
 Although 
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 The point was made by Baten, Foldvari, van Leeuwen, and van Zanden (2009) 
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their approach was in several respects less than ideal, it was, at that time, perhaps the 
only possible since historical income distribution data are so scarce.
3
 
 
More recently, Baten, Foldvari, van Leeuwen, and van Zanden (2009) [in the rest of the 
text BFLZ] have expanded and improved on the Bourguignon and Morrisson approach by 
using for the countries for which actual income distribution data were lacking either (i) an 
estimate of inequality based on the evolution of the unskilled wage/GDP ratio,
4
 or (ii) by 
substituting for countries’ missing income distributions, the data  on the distribution of 
individual heights. For (i), if unskilled wage-to-GDP ratio increases, the assumption is 
that income inequality declines; for (ii), if there is a strong relationship between 
distribution  of  individual heights and distribution of income, then we can ―enrich‖ the 
dataset  on countries’ income distributions by adding the data on countries for which we 
possess the  distributions of heights.
5
 In that way, the Bourguignon-Morrisson ―backward 
projections‖ are not used at all. The other building block of the exercise, the reliance on 
Maddison’s GDP per capita data, was unchanged. 
 
In this paper,  I  proceed to do three things. First,  I use social tables from thirteen 18
th
 
and 19
th
 century countries to estimate global inequality for the early 19
th
 century. Social 
tables have not been used for such a purpose before. Second, I present a story of global 
inequality between the beginning of the 19
th
 and the beginning of the 21
st
 century that at 
its two end-points relies on my own estimates and uses Bourguignon-Morrisson or BFLZ 
estimates for the years in-between. Third, I apply the concept of  the inequality extraction 
ratio (used earlier by Milanovic 2006, and Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson, 2009 
within country-wide framework) to global scale.  In other words, I ask how close was 
global inequality between citizens to its maximum feasible amount (given global mean 
                                                 
3
 For 33 ―representative‖ countries’ distributions, Bourguignon and Morrisson give 11 data points per 
country (nine bottom deciles and two top ventiles). However, these are the already ―processed‖ data and it 
is not clear how many actual independent data points the authors had. For example, if only a Gini is 
available for a given country/year and the authors assume a lognormal distribution, then there is not a 
single fractile datum, but just an overall statistic  like the Gini, available. It is also possible that, basing 
themselves on published quintiles, Bourguignon and Morrisson estimated  deciles.  
4
 The approach was pioneered by Bairoch (1981) and Williamson (1998); it was used most recently by 
Prados de la Escosura (2008)..  
5
 The approach was introduced by Baten (2000). 
 4 
income) during the last two centuries. I conclude the paper with some speculative notes, 
which should be improved in the future. 
 
1. Global inequality in the early XIX century 
 
The data. Let us start with the two building blocks. For GDP per capita, I too use 
Maddison’s data for all countries (for which they are available, of course). I do this, to 
some extent, faute de mieux because  Maddison’s data may be in the need of serious 
revisions on account of new, and for China, India, Indonesia etc. dramatically different, 
estimates of the price levels in 2005. The revision of PPPs (domestic price levels) as 
result of  the 2005 International Comparison Project led to the corresponding revisions of  
these countries’ current real incomes, and this level change then ―percolates‖ (carries 
over) to the historical income levels.
6
 However, since these revisions have not yet been 
done by Maddison or anyone else (and they would need to be massive),  I use 
Maddison’s 2004 GDP per capita data expressed in Geary-Khamis 1990 international 
dollars. 
 
The second building block, the income distribution data, comes from the social tables for 
13 countries that have been calculated by different authors and put together within a 
single framework by Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2009) paper. (Detailed 
explanation of all social tables is available in an annex to MLW paper.)  
 
For the  ―early‖ 19th century I use  the ―time window‖  of 1750-1880  because for this 
period I  have social tables from 13 countries. The time window is wide. This is due  to 
the fact that. in order to have a sufficiently comprehensive coverage of the world, I need 
to include both India and China. Now, the social table for Moghul India is available for 
the year 1750, while the first social table that we have for China is for the year 1880. The 
dates of these two social tables therefore frame our time window. In-between, from 
Europe, I have social tables from Old Castille 1752, France 1788, England and Wales 
1801, the Netherlands 1808, and Kingdom of Naples 1811; from Latin America, I have 
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 See Milanovic (2009). 
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Nueva Espaňa (Mexico) 1790, Chile 1861, Brazil 1872 and Peru 1876. Finally, there is 
an additional social table from Asia (Java 1880), and one from Africa (Maghreb 1880).   
 
In reality, as this list makes clear, the future advanced (developed) countries have their 
social tables up to the early 19
th
 century only. That was intentionally done in MLW 
paper, which dealt with pre-industrial inequality, so as to limit the investigation to not yet 
industrialized countries. As is conventionally believed, after the end of the Napoleonic 
wars, Great Britain, France, Belgium and the Netherlands already engaged into 
industrialization. But for other countries, MLW collected social tables up to a much later 
date (since they were still preindustrial). In the context of this paper, it means that one 
can argue that treating the whole sample as giving a snapshot of pre-industrial global 
inequality, around early to mid 19
th
 century, does not involve a significant  bias. This is 
because GDP per capita  of countries that enter our sample at later dates (the three Latin 
American countries, Maghreb, Java and China) registered no appreciable economic 
progress between the early 19
th
 century and 1860-1880 when they enter the sample. 
According to Maddison (2004), China’s GDP per capita decreased from $PPP 600 in 
1820 to $PPP 530 in 1870 (no datum for 1880 is given). For Indonesia, the change was 
from $PPP 612 in 1820 to $PPP 654 in 1880. For Brazil, from $PPP 647 in 1820 to $PPP 
718 in 1870.  Since most of global inequality after 1820 was driven by fast growth of the 
industrializing nations, for which we have early 19
th
 century social tables, and economies 
and distributions of other nations were stagnant between the early 19
th
 century and 1870-
1880 when they enter the sample, we can assume that our sample gives us a reasonable 
snapshot of global inequality around 1820.   
 
The social tables from the period 1750-1880 include 650 million people. According to 
Maddison,  total world population moved from almost 1 billion in 1820 to 1.1 billion in 
1850 to 1.2 billion in 1870. Therefore an average population at any point between 1750 
and 1880 can be estimated at between 950 million and a billion. Our time-window 
therefore comprises around 2/3 of  the world population living at any point between 1750 
and 1880. 
 
 6 
How are average social group incomes converted into equivalent 1990 PPPs? The 13 
social tables that we use have in total 591 social groups. That means that we have average 
national currency income data for 591 social groups. (One such social table for England 
and Wales 1801-03 is given in the Annex.) These national currency income per social 
group are converted into 1990 PPP dollars using  (i) Maddison GDP per capita data and, 
(ii) for the countries for which Maddison’s data are unavailable, the ratio between 
average income across all social classes and the subsistence minimum with the latter 
priced at $PPP 300 per year. According to the first method,  the group income estimates 
are done by linking national currency mean income (calculated across all social groups) 
to GDP per capita from Maddison. To explain: from the social table for (say) Brazil  in 
1872, we calculate that the average per capita income is 311 milreis. From Maddison’s 
(2004) GDP per capita data, we know that the estimated GDP per capita for Brazil in 
1872 is $PPP 721. By linking the two, we obtain the conversion ratio for 1872 milreis  
into 1990 international dollars (1 milreis is worth $PPP 2.3 of year 1990). This then 
enables us to directly convert average milreis income of every social class into its 1990 
$PPP equivalents.  For some  data prior to 1820, the procedure is different. When we do 
not have Maddison’s GDP per capita data, we need to get an estimate of the subsistence 
minimum in local currency (of the time). Thus, for example for Kingdom of Naples 1811, 
the estimated subsistence minimum is 31 ducats per capita annually (from Melanima 
2000). Since the subsistence minimum is by assumption priced  at $300 PPP dollars at 
1990 prices, we again directly get the conversion factor (1 ducat from year 1811 = $PPP 
9.67 in year 1990). Using this conversion factor, we convert mean contemporary ducat  
incomes of each social group into 1990 $PPP equivalents. 
 
We thus obtain $PPP-equivalent average incomes for all 591 social groups that are 
included in our sample. The number of groups and their population sizes vary between 
the countries. The average  number of groups ranges from only  3 for China in 1880 and 
Nueva Espaňa in 1790 to 375 occupational groups for Brazil 1872. The average number 
of  groups per country is 45 (without Brazil, the average number of groups drops to 18). 
On average, therefore the number of groups is sufficiently large to provide a reasonable  
 7 
estimate of overall inequality within each nation. 
7
Although a small number of groups 
biases the national Gini downward, the bias need not be strong if the social structure of a 
society is not very complex. For example, if most of peasants lived at, or  near, the 
subsistence minimum in China around 1880, then the fact that we have only three social 
groups for China, need not imply a strong downward bias to the calculated  inequality. 
(The presumption is also that the authors of social tables divided each society into salient 
and sufficiently income-differentiated groups, so that most of country’s inequality is 
captured by income differences between the social groups.) 
 
Global inequality around 1820. The average income for our sample is exactly $PPP 600. 
The country with the highest mean income is England and Wales 1801-03 with $PPP 
2000, the country with the lowest, Moghul India in 1750 with $PPP 530.  
 
Inequality indices for the sample are given in Table 1. The global Gini works out as 38.5. 
Table 1 also compares this result with Bourguignon and Morrison calculations for 1820. 
The Gini of 38.5 is significantly lower than the Bourguignon-Morrison value of  50. An 
obvious reason is a smaller coverage of our dataset. As mentioned above, it provides the 
coverage for  2/3 of  world  population that has, on average, lived in that period. But if for 
all the missing countries,  we supplement our data with the data from Bourguignon and 
Morrisson  (16 countries)
8
, we increase the coverage to about 90 percent, the number of 
independent data points to 767, and the global Gini goes up to 43.3. This will be our 
estimate for the early 19
th
 century global inequality.  It is not far off  BFLZ (2009) 
estimate of 47 (see their Table 4). As I shall argue below, Bourguignon and Morrisson 
estimate of Gini 50 for 1820 seems implausibly large. 
 
In comparison with today’s inequality, global inequality in the period 1750-1880 was 
much lower. The most recent global inequality estimate, calculated from individual 
household survey data around year 2002,  is 65 Gini points, using the ―old‖ PPPs which 
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 However, for the discussion of this point see Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2009). 
8
 The ―countries‖ are Austria-Czechoslovakia-Hungary, Australia-Canada-New Zealand, the Balkans, Ivory 
Coast-Ghana-Kenya, Germany, Egypt, Japan, Korea-Taiwan, Nigeria, Philippines-Thailand, Poland, 
Russia, Scandinavia, Turkey, USA and South Africa.   
 8 
are based on the same benchmark PPP as the 1990 PPPs used by Maddison. If we use the 
more recent PPP values (from the 2005 International Comparison Project), the global 
Gini is 70.7. This is due to a significant reduction of  GDPs per capita or average 
household survey incomes for China, India and several other Asian countries (see 
Milanovic, 2009). 
 
It is interesting to focus on the highest  incomes in our sample. Incomes above $PPP 
70,000 per capita, which would place such individuals into the top global percentile 
today, are registered in the Netherlands, Java (which was a Dutch colony then), Chile and 
(a practically negligible number) in Brazil. The total  number of people with such high 
incomes is minute however. It was less than 5,000  (out of 650 million people). Yet it is 
clear that enormously rich people, by today’s standards, liven then too. 
 9 
 
Table 1. Global (Concept 3) inequality in early 19
th
 century 
 This paper Bourguignon and 
Morrisson (2002) 
BFLZ (2009) 
 1750-1880 
Countries 
with social 
tables only 
1750-1880 
Countries 
with social 
tables plus 
distributio
n data 
from BM 
(year 
1820) 
1820 1820 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Gini 38.5 43.3 50.0 47.0 
Theil (0) 60.9 57.9 48.5 n.a. 
     
Global average income 
of population included 
(in 1990 $PPP) 
 
600 646 652* 687 
Total population 
included (in m) 
 
650 861 1057* 921 
Population coverage (%) 
 
~66 ~90 ~100 >90**** 
Number of countries*** 
 
13 29 33 40 
Number of independent 
data points 
591 <767 <363** n.a. 
Note: The difference in total population in Columns (2) and (3) stems from the fact that countries with 
social tables enter population in column (2) with their actual populations in the year when the social table 
was created while in Column (3) they enter with their populations in year 1820. Thus in column (2) India’s 
population is 182 million and in Column (3) it is 209 million. 
The 100 percent coverage by Bourguignon and Morrisson has to be taken by grain of salt since the data 
were ―forced‖ (through generous use of estimates) to cover 100 percent of the population. 
* Calculated directly from the Bourguignon-Morrisson tables, Data_WD19.xls  (supplied by the authors 
separately from the paper). 
** See footnote 1 above. 
*** The number of countries is not fully comparable. For example, Bourguignon and Morrisson, treat 
Bangladesh/Pakistan and India as two countries; we treat them as one as the 1750 data refer to the entire 
subcontinent.   
 *** BFLF (Table 4) give 88 percent for their coverage but that number seems to be based on somewhat 
higher estimate of world population in 1820 (1.046 billion) than what we use here. 
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2. The changing composition of global inequality, 1820-2002 
 
While the social tables and (obviously) the survey data for the early 19
th
 century are not 
fully available so that global inequality must always be estimated quite approximately, 
Maddison’s GDP data allow us to compute with much more precision Concept 2 
inequality. Concept 2 or international population-weighted inequality is an inequality 
index computed across GDPs per capita of countries at a given point in time, where each 
GDP per capita is weighted by country’s population (see Milanovic, 2005).  
 
Concept 2 and Concept 3 (or global) inequality are, in the case of Gini, linked as in 
relation (1). Concept 2 inequality also represents the between component of global 
inequality, that is inequality that would exist if each individual had mean income of 
his/her country. The within component (the part of global inequality due to income 
inequalities within each country) is the rest of expression (1). 
 
Global inequality = LpGppyy
n
i
iiiji
n
i
n
ij
ij  



)(
1
     (1) 
 
 
 
 
where yj = mean income or GDP per capita of country j, pj = population share of country 
j, πj = income share of country j (country j-th share in global income), μ = global average 
per capita income, and L = overlap term (which can be treated as part of the within 
component; it is greater than zero any time there are people from a poorer country that 
are better off than some people from a mean-richer country).  
 
The difference between the Concepts 2 and 3 consists of intra-national inequality or, in 
other words, of the within component. Today, the between component—on account of 
huge differences in mean incomes between the countries—represents at least 85 percent 
of global inequality. 
9
 But was this the case in the past? 
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 See Milanovic (2005). 
Concept 2 inequality 
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Table 2 provides Concept 2 computations for four dates in the 19th century for which 
Maddison provides a sufficient number of GDPs per capita. We should focus on years 
1820 and 1870 for which Maddison’s data give an almost full coverage of the world. The 
Gini coefficient more than doubles from about 15 to 32. This reflects the well known 
phenomenon of income divergence that started precisely in the 19
th
 century. Concept 2 
inequality continued to rise throughout the beginning of the 20
th
 century, then stabilized 
at a rather high plateau of 55-60 Gini points between the end of World War II and today. 
(It has been decreasing in the last twenty years thanks to high growth rates of China and 
India.
10
)   
 
As the last two columns in Table 2 show, today Concept  2 international inequality can be 
estimated at 56 to 63 Gini points, depending on whether we use GDP per capita or survey 
means. This is some 7 Gini points higher than what we get when we use  old‖ PPPs.  As 
already mentioned, this is because new PPPs show relatively high price levels, and thus 
imply lower real incomes, for China, India, Indonesia and a number of other Asian 
countries.   
 
What is striking is not solely that Concept 2 inequality was much lower than it is now 
(one needs also to note that in the 19
th
 century, we calculate Concept 2 inequality  across  
only 60 countries while today we do it over twice as many), but that the composition of 
global inequality was so much different.  Using our estimate of global inequality in the 
early 19
th
 century of around Gini 43 points, we see that Concept 2 inequality represented  
then only 35 percent of global inequality: 15.2 Gini points out of 43 Gini points. (If we 
use Theil, the percentage is even smaller.) Today when global inequality is about 65-70 
Gini points, 
11
 Concept 2 inequality accounts for 80-85  percent of global inequality (see 
the last column in Table 1). So the share of between-country inequality in global 
inequality has doubled during the last two centuries.
12
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 This can be seen if we compare the data for 1980 and the first column for 2002 which is based on ―old‖ 
PPPs (see Table 2). 
11
 See Milanovic (2009). 
12
 Using Theil (0) index, the share increased by a factor of eight.   
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Table 2. Concept 2 international population-weighted inequality and global inequality 
 Using Maddison’s GDP per capita and 1990 benchmark PPPs Using WDI 
GDPs and 
1990 
benchmark 
PPPs 
Using 
household 
survey means 
and 2005 
benchmark 
PPPs 
Using WDI 
GDPs and 
2005 
benchmark 
PPPs 
 1820 1850 
 
1870 
 
1913* 1929 1950 1960 1980 2002 2002 2002 
(1) Concept 2 Gini 15.2 25.9 31.9 44.3 48.0 55.0 54.0 56.8 52.6 63.0 59.9 
(2) Concept 2 Theil 
(0) 
4.55 12.0 17.1 32.6 39.3 54.4 53.5 62.7 50.6 77.2 69.2 
(3) Global average 
income (in $PPP) 
689 916 911 1,599 1,941 2,111 2,778 4,520 7,099 3,665 8,123 
(4) Total  population 
included (in m) 
941 623 1,178 1,666 1,775 2,518 3,030 4,423 5,775 5,802 6,004 
(5) Estimated world 
population 
1,057 1,201 1,266 1,719 2.042 2,518 3,030 4,423 6,172 6,172 6,172 
(6) Population 
coverage (4)/(5)  
(in %) 
89 52 93 97 87 100 100 100 94 94 99 
(7) Number of 
countries 
53 24 63 66 53 141 141 141 114 120 153 
(8) Global inequality 
(Gini points) 
43 
 
53.2 
(50) 
56.0 
(53) 
61.0 
(58) 
61.6 
(62) 
64.0 
(65) 
63.5 
(64) 
65.7 
(65) 
65.4 70.7 70.7 
(9) Global inequality 
(Theil 0) 
58 48.5 54.4 66.8 69.0 77.5 76.6 85.0 82.5 104.8 104.8 
(10) Share of 
between inequality in 
global Gini (1)/(8) 
35 49 57 73 78 86 85 86 
 
80 89 85 
(11) Share of 
between inequality in 
global Theil (2)/(9) 
8 25 31 49 57 70 70 74 
 
61 74 66 
Sources: All Concept 2 statistics calculated from Maddison’s 2004 data, except for 2002, calculated from World Development Indicators and World Income Distribution (WYD) database. Estimated 
global population from Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002, Table 1).Global inequality estimates (line 8) for the period 1850-1980 are from Bourguignon and Morrisson (on top) and from Baten, 
Foldvari, van Leeuwen and van Zanden (between brackets). Global inequality for the year 1820 as calculated here; for 2002, from Milanovic (2009).* Bourguignon and Morrisson population and 
global inequality data are for year 1910.  [2002 values calculated from my global_new.dta, except 2002 with 1990 PPPs calculated from world2002.dta.]
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 We can summarize this by writing out the composition of global inequality in the 
early 19
th
 and 21
st
 century as follows: 
 
 Early 19th century: Inequality between individuals in the world: Gini around 43. 
 
= 35 percent due to differences in average country incomes (15 Gini points)   
+ 65 percent due to within-national income differences (28 Gini points). 
 
 
Early 21
st
 century: Inequality between individuals in the world: Gini around 70. 
 
= 85-90 percent  due to differences in average country incomes (60-63 Gini) 
+ 10-15  percent due to within-national income differences (7 Gini points). 
 
These two simple relationships describe the change that has occurred globally during the 
last two centuries: inequality between individuals is much higher today than 200 years 
ago, but –more dramatically—its composition has totally reversed: from being 
predominantly driven by within-national inequalities (that is, by what could be called 
―class‖ inequality), it is today overwhelmingly determined by differences in mean 
country incomes (what could be called the ―location‖ or citizenship inequality). This 
latter, ―locational‖ element was ―worth‖ 15 Gini points in the early 19th  century; it is 
―worth‖ 60-63 Gini points today. 
 
The evolution of the share of between inequality in global inequality is shown in Figure 
1. The share is calculated based on Milanovic’s estimates of global inequality for 1820 
and 2002, and Bourguignon and Morrisson’s for all points in-between. With BFLZ 
estimates of global inequality, which are for the 19
th
 century lower by about 3 Gini points 
than Bourguignon and Morrisson’s (see Table 2), the share of  the between-country 
inequality in the 19
th
 century would be slightly higher. The trend would not be affected 
however. 
 14 
 
Figure 1. Share of between-country inequality in global inequality:  
Selected years, 1820-2002 (in percent of global Gini) 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
1820 1850 1870 1913 1929 1950 1960 1980 2002
 
Note: Based on Milanovic’s estimates of global inequality for 1820 and 2002, and Bourguignon 
and Morrisson for all points in-between. Concept 2 inequality is calculated from Maddison (2004) 
data. 
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3. Did global inequality extraction ratio decline? 
 
Definition of the inequality  extraction ratio.  MLW (2009) have developed the concept 
of inequality possibility frontier.  Simply put, this is the maximum Gini that is achievable 
at a given level of mean income provided that all population but an infinitesimally small 
elite live at least at the subsistence minimum. To understand the concept intuitively, 
imagine a society whose mean income is just barely above subsistence. Then the 
maximum Gini, however small the elite (at the extreme, the elite could be composed of 
one individual), cannot be high because a vast majority (99.999% etc.) of bilateral 
income comparisons that enter into the creation of Gini will yield zeros (since all other 
individual but the elite have the same, subsistence, income). As the average income 
grows, the constraint on the maximum Gini is relaxed. The inequality possibility frontier, 
the locus of maximum Ginis as mean income rises, is given by equation (2):  
 
)1(
1
)*( 


 

G           (2) 
 
where α = average income of a community expressed in terms of  subsistence,  G* = 
maximum feasible Gini, and ε = the share of the elite in total population. Clearly as ε→0, 
(2) simplifies to: 
 



1
)*(

G           (3) 
 
 
Thus, for example, if the average income of a community is twice the subsistence, the 
maximum feasible Gini will be 50 ((2-1)/2 expressed in percentage terms). But if, as in 
modern rich societies, the average income is some 100 times the subsistence, than the 
maximum feasible Gini is 99, very close to what we tended to regard (before the 
introduction of G*) as the maximum Gini regardless of average income level. 
 
For Theil(0), the maximum feasible inequlaity is: 
 
 16 
)ln()*(  T          (4) 
 
The ratio between the actual (measured) Gini, G, and the maximum feasible Gini (G/G*) 
gives the inequality extraction ratio which can be interpreted as the share of maximum 
inequality  extracted by the elite. Clearly, as that percentage increases, the elite can be 
said to have been more successful in extracting the surplus. The approach has been 
applied by  MLW to thirty pre-industrial societies, running from  the Imperial Rome in 
year 14 to Siam and Kenya in 1927.
13
  The average extraction ratio over these thirty 
societies is 75 percent. For seven societies (six of them colonies), the extraction ratio was 
around 100 percent—that is, the inequality was pushed close to its maximum, compatible 
with the physiological survival of the society. (Note that the Gini can even exceed the 
maximum if some people temporarily survive at less than the subsistence. In the medium 
term,  the extraction ratios above 100 percent are possible only if population decreases.) 
 
The stylized, but also very consistent picture, for modern developed societies is that of a 
decreasing inequality extraction ratio with rising mean per capita income. For example, 
for England and Wales (later United Kingdom) for which we have the most complete 
data series, the inequality extraction ratio drops from 70 percent in 1290 (when England’s 
α was 2.1) to about 55 percent in 1688 and 1759 (α’s of respectively 4.7 and 5.9), 
increases to 60 percent in 1801 (α=6.7), and then begins a more or less steady decline to 
38 percent today (α=66). 14  In other words, inequality in developed countries generally 
decreased, or even when it went up, it increased less than the maximum feasible 
inequality.  
 
Global results. Now, the question can be asked: can the same methodology be applied 
globally? The answer is yes, but with one important caveat. When this methodology was 
applied to individual countries, it made sense also in implicitly assessing how rapacious 
or successful was the elite in extracting the surplus. Combined with an analysis of class 
structure of a given society (e.g., the share of the middle classes), it provided an insight 
                                                 
13
 And quite exceptionally India in 1947, at the independence from Britain. 
14
 See MLW (2009, Table 2).  
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into the social and political structure of a polity. At the global level, however, there is no 
single elite and no single government (then or now) and the application of the 
methodology makes sense certainly in an accounting sense, but perhaps much less as a 
tool that would enable us to gain further insight into the social structure of a given society 
(with society being here ―the globe‖). Yet, perhaps depending on one’s perspective  (e.g., 
taking a ―world-systems‖ perspective) the global inequality extraction ratio could be seen 
as more than an accounting tool. In effect, the results obtained below will, to some extent,  
lead us to pose, if not to answer, that question.  
 
The ―accounting‖ part is useful not the least because we may want to know whether the 
low measured Gini in the early 19
th
 century (around 43 Gini points) can in part be 
―explained‖ by the overall low level of global income. Or differently, whether the 
increase in global inequality that we observe in the last two centuries is associated with 
the removal of the constraint that low income sets to maximum feasible inequality. 
 
Using the data on global average income (GDP per capita) from Table 2 and assuming 
the subsistence minimum to be $PPP 300 (as in Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson, 
2009)  we can directly calculate G* (see Table 3). 
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Table 3. Global inequality extraction ratio, 1820-2002 
 Using 
Maddison 
GDP data 
and  
Milanovic 
global 
inequality 
estimate 
Using Maddison GDP per capita and population data and 1990 PPPs, and Bourguignon-
Morrisson global inequality estimates  
 
Using 2002 
WDI GDPs and 
2005 PPPs 
benchmark and 
Milanovic 
global inequality 
estimate 
 1820 1850 
 
1870 
 
1913 1929 1950 1960 1980 2002 
Global average GDP 
per capita (in $PPP) 
689 916 911 1599 1941 2111 2778 4520 5886 
Global average 
income/subsistence 
(ratio) 
2.30 3.05 3.04 5.33 6.47 7.04 9.26 15.07 19.62 
Maximum feasible 
Gini 
56 67 67 81 85 86 89 93 95 
Maximum feasible 
Theil (in %) 
83 112 111 167 187 195 223 271 298 
Estimated global Gini 43 53.2 56.0 61.0 61.6 64 63.5 65.7 70.7 
Estimated global 
Theil(0) 
58 49 54 67 69 78 77 85 105 
Estimated global Gini 
inequality extraction 
ratio (in %) 
77 79 83 75 73 75 71 70 73 
Estimated global Theil 
inequality extraction 
ratio (in %) 
70 43 49 40 37 40 34 31 35 
Sources: 1820-1980 global average income calculated from Maddison’s data; global Gini  from Maddison and Bourguignon (2002) that base themselves to Maddison’s data (all 
data in 1990 PPPs). 2002, global income calculated from World Development indicati9rs (in 2002 PPPs, based on the benchmark 2005 ICP). Global inequality for 2002 calculated 
from Milanovic World Income Distribution (WYD) database; all in 2002 PPPs, based on benchmark 2005 ICP. Therefore, the PPPs used for year 2002 differ from Maddison’s 
1990 Geary-Khamis PPPs by US CPI increase between 1990 and 2002 (38 percent) as well as  major revisions in relative price levels that occurred in 2005 International 
Comparison Project. The data for 2002 ($PPP 5886) correct for the former (that is, formally they are expressed in 1990 international prices) but cannot correct for the latter.
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The striking fact, revealed by these numbers, is that the Gini global inequality extraction 
ratio today is at about the same level as in the early 19th century.  If we use Bourguignon 
and Morrison’s historical data,  it could be said to have remained stable over the last two 
hundred years with the exception of a moderate tick up around 1850-1870 (see Figure 
3).
15
  With BFLZ (2009) data, the Gini inequality extraction ratio in 19
th
 century is 
somewhat higher, and accordingly is higher too than  it is today. If we use Theil 
inequality extraction ratio, today’s values are significantly lower than those of the early 
19
th
 century, but after 1850, there is little downward movement. In any case, in the last 
one hundred years, we do not see any compelling evidence for a decline in the global 
inequality extraction ratio, measured either by the Gini or Theil index. What has 
happened is that the maximum feasible Gini has risen pari passu with the actual global 
Gini thus broadly keeping the inequality extraction ratio unchanged (see Figure 2, left 
panel).  
 
Combining this with the earlier finding that the composition of global inequality has 
shifted from being ―caused‖ by internal factors, like domestic income distribution, to 
―external‖ like differences in mean country incomes, we can conclude that the main 
―inequality extractors‖ today are not (within)-national elites, but an elite which is 
basically composed of citizens of rich countries.  
                                                 
15
 The result  also shows why the Bourguignon-Morrisson estimate of Gini 50 for global inequality in 1820 
is implausibly high. Using their own global mean income of $PPP 652, it can be shown that the maximum 
feasible Gini could be only 54 points and that the inequality extraction ratio would have to be greater than  
90 percent. This cannot be totally rejected but seems implausibly high in light of the results  for the 
subsequent years. 
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We can summarize the change that occurred over two centuries as follows: 
 
Early 19th century: Global mean income was 2.3 times the 
subsistence. Maximum feasible global Gini was 56 while 
the actual global Gini was around 43. Thus, actual 
inequality ―exhausted‖ some ¾ of maximum inequality. 
  
 
Early 21
st
 century: Global mean income is 19.6 times the 
(same physiological) subsistence. Maximum feasible global 
Gini is  93 while the actual global Gini is around 70. Thus, 
actual inequality ―exhausted‖ (still) some ¾ of maximum 
inequality. 
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Figure 2. Global inequality frontier and global inequality, 1820-2002 
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Note: All global average incomes, including for 2002 expressed in 1990 PPP (see note to Table 3). [From summary_utrecht.dta. ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 22 
 
Why is the world income distribution such that during the last century, the rich have 
extracted a constant of about 70 percent of global maximum feasible inequality?  This is 
a question that I cannot try to answer now. But it may be addressed in another paper. 
However,  for the future we may hazard some projections. Since global mean income is 
already quite high, almost 20 times the subsistence, the increase in the maximum feasible 
Gini will be quite limited. This means that the only venue for the reduction in global 
inequality extraction ratio remains an effective reduction in measured global inequality 
(which currently stands at 70 Gini points). For it  to go down, inter-country differences in 
mean incomes must decrease, and in particular those between poor and rich populous 
countries. Thus, both global inequality and global inequality extraction ratio 
fundamentally depend on what I called elsewhere (Milanovic 2005), the relationship 
within the triangle of China, India and the United States. If the mean-normalized absolute 
distance between China and India, on the one hand, and the US, on the other, decreases, 
then we are likely to observe favorable developments in this century. 
16
  
 
                                                 
16
 Note that for the Gini to go down, it is not sufficient that China grows faster than the US (as many people 
assume). China must grow sufficiently fast to reduce the absolute distance with the United States, 
normalized by world mean income. Suppose that the world mean income is constant, and US grows by 1 
percent per annum. For the US-China Gini component to be reduced China needs to grow by 10 percent per 
annum (since its mean income is about 1/10
th
 of the US level). 
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Figure 3. Global Gini inequality extraction 
ratio 1820-2002 (in percent) 
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Note: Bars based on the data from Table 3. Dots based on global inequlaity calculations of  Baten,  
Foldvari, van Leeuwen, and van Zanden 
[From summary_utrecht.dta. ] 
 
Figure 4. Global Theil inequality extraction 
ratio 1820-2002 (in percent) 
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4. Conclusions 
 
Several conclusions can be made. 
 
1. Global inequality around 1820 was probably around 43-45 Gini points rather than 50 
points as estimated by Bourguignon and  Morrisson (2002). The latter value would have 
implied an unlikely high inequality extraction ratio of around 90 percent.  
 
2. Global inequality increased from Gini of  43-45 points in the early 19
th
 century to some 
65-70 Gini points today. Even more remarkable is that the composition of global 
inequality changed from being  driven by class differences within countries to being 
driven by locational income differences (that is, by the differences in mean country 
incomes). The latter accounted for only 15 Gini points around 1820,  but account for 
more than 60 Gini points today.  
 
3. Although the inequality extraction ratios have steadily and often dramatically 
decreased within individual countries as they developed in the course of the last two 
centuries (see MLW, 2009), the global inequality extraction ratio has only mildly 
declined since its 19
th
 century level and has remained stable in the last 100 years.  
 
4. This means that global inequality has increased at about the same rate as the maximum 
feasible inequality (the latter’s increase being determined by the rise in mean global 
income), leaving the global inequality extraction ratio at around 70 percent.  
 
5. The implication of  (a) changing composition of global inequality and (b) stable 
inequality extraction ratio is that  the main ―inequality extractors‖ today are citizens of 
rich countries rather than individual national elites as was the case two hundred years 
ago. 
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ANNEX: Social table for England and Wales 1801-03 
 
 
Social group 
 
Number of 
people  
Percentage of 
population 
Per capita  
income   
(in £ per annum) 
Income in terms 
of per capita 
mean 
Paupers 1040716 11.5 2.5 0.11 
Persons imprisoned for debt 10000 0.11 6 0.27 
Laborers in husbandry 1530000 16.9 6.9 0.31 
Hawkers, pedlars, duffers 4000 0.04 8 0.36 
Laborers in mines, canals 180000 1.99 8.9 0.41 
Vagrants 175218 1.94 10 0.46 
Artisans, mechanics, laborers 2005767 22.16 12.2 0.56 
Clerks and shopmen 300000 3.31 15 0.68 
Freeholders, lesser 600000 6.63 18 0.82 
Farmers 960000 10.6 20 0.91 
Innkeepers and publicans 250000 2.76 20 0.91 
Lesser clergymen 50000 0.55 24 1.09 
Dissenting clergy, itinerants 12500 0.14 24 1.09 
Education of youth 120000 1.33 25 1.14 
Military officers 65320 0.72 27.8 1.27 
Common soldiers 121985 1.35 29 1.32 
Naval officers 35000 0.39 29.8 1.36 
Shopkeepers and tradesmen 372500 4.11 30 1.37 
Tailors, milliners, etc. 125000 1.38 30 1.37 
Confined lunatics 2500 0.03 30 1.37 
Freeholders, greater 220000 2.43 36.4 1.66 
Marines and seamen 52906 0.58 38 1.73 
Lesser offices 52500 0.58 40 1.82 
Engineers, surveyors, etc. 25000 0.28 40 1.82 
Merchant service 49393 0.55 40 1.82 
Keeping houses for lunatics 400 0.004 50 2.28 
Theatrical pursuits 4000 0.04 50 2.28 
Liberal arts and sciences 81500 0.9 52 2.37 
Law, judges to clerks 55000 0.61 70 3.19 
Eminent clergymen 6000 0.07 83.3 3.8 
Gents 160000 1.77 87.5 3.99 
Shipowners, freight 25000 0.28 100 4.56 
Higher civil offices 14000 0.15 114.3 5.21 
Lesser merchants, by sea 91000 1.01 114.3 5.21 
Building & repairing ships 1800 0.02 116.7 5.32 
Warehousemen, wholesale 3000 0.03 133.3 6.08 
Manufacturers 150000 1.66 133.3 6.08 
Knights 3500 0.04 150 6.84 
Esquires 60000 0.66 150 6.84 
Educators in universities 2000 0.02 150 6.84 
Baronets 8100 0.09 200 9.12 
Eminent merchants, bankers 20000 0.22 260 11.86 
Spiritual peers 390 0.004 266.7 12.16 
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Social group 
 
Number of 
people  
Percentage of 
population 
Per capita  
income   
(in £ per annum) 
Income in terms 
of per capita 
mean 
Temporal peers  7175 0.08 320 14.59 
Total 9053170 100 21.93 1 
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